The maritime consultancy Drewry has published a series of sector analyses on the implications of the armed conflict between the United States and Iran for international maritime transport, following the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz on February 28, 2026. The reports, which cover the segments of tankers, LNG carriers, dry bulk, containers, and breakbulk cargo, all highlight that the disruption of traffic through this strategic corridor will have profound consequences on energy supply chains, freight markets, and the global economy, though with varying degrees of intensity depending on the type of vessel and cargo.
According to Drewry's data, the Strait of Hormuz channels approximately 15 million barrels per day (mbpd) of crude oil, which accounts for about one-third of the world's maritime oil trade. All major OPEC producers in the Middle East —Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Iraq— heavily rely on this route for their crude oil exports. While Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Iraq have pipelines that offer partial land export options, their combined available capacity is estimated at only about 4 mbpd. Consequently, the current blockade has interrupted more than 11 mbpd of crude supply, a figure that could trigger a sharp escalation in oil prices, greater volatility in the markets, and significant effects on inflation and economic growth on a global scale.
Future markets have already begun to incorporate geopolitical risk. The price of Brent crude jumped from $73.15 on February 27, before hostilities began, to $79.11 on March 2, following retaliatory attacks in the Gulf. Drewry warns that any sustained rise in crude oil prices would directly translate to marine fuel (bunker) prices, as the raw materials for refineries are linked to oil quotations. In a scenario of prolonged supply restriction, refineries might be forced to reduce their activity due to a lack of available crude or margin compression, which in turn would restrict the production of fuel oil and marine diesel, straining bunker supply and raising operational costs across all segments of maritime transport.
Approximately 88% of the crude that transits through the Strait of Hormuz is destined for Asian markets, with China, India, and Japan being the main importers. In the short term, Drewry expects buyers to rush to secure alternative barrels from West Africa, Latin America, and North America, significantly expanding long-haul routes. This increase in ton-mile demand and repositioning of vessels will create a temporary contraction in available tonnage, which could drive up freight rates in the tanker segment, particularly for VLCCs (Very Large Crude Carriers). However, the consultancy clarifies that if the disruption prolongs, the dynamic could reverse: OECD countries' commercial crude oil reserves currently cover about 62 days of future demand, according to the International Energy Agency, but they are a temporary buffer and not a structural solution. A prolonged disruption would ultimately reduce global crude trade volumes, erode demand, and put downward pressure on freight rates after the initial spike.
Impact on LNG, LPG, and dry bulk
In the LNG segment, Drewry estimates that around 2 million tons of weekly supply from Qatar and the Emirates would be blocked, a figure that could reach between 5 and 6 million tons monthly if tensions persist. In the short term, the consultancy expects a spike in LNG prices, although freight rates for LNG carriers will not immediately follow the same trend, given that the number of idle vessels will increase and repositioning will be limited as seasonable demand softens in Europe and remains contained in Asia. However, if the blockade prolongs, Asian buyers will be forced to seek alternative supplies, especially ahead of summer demand. India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan could increase their imports of U.S. LNG, while the share of Russian LNG destined for China and other South Asian countries could grow. Australia would also increase its exports. In Europe, countries like Italy, Belgium, and Poland, which still import LNG from Qatar, show the greatest exposure to disruption, although Europe's share in total Middle Eastern exports stands between 10% and 12%, compared to over 80% represented by Asia.
LPG is among the most exposed segments. Nearly 40% of the global LPG supply transits annually through the Strait of Hormuz, directly impacting importers such as India and China. Drewry predicts that the VLGCs (Very Large Gas Carriers) near the strait will become inactive or move to safe positions. A sustained blockade would force vessels to reposition towards the United States, where new terminal capacity and solid natural gas liquids production can support higher exports. The movement of ballast vessels will create a short-term contraction in available tonnage, causing volatility in rates, although the consultancy expects vessel availability to increase in the Gulf of the United States, which, along with reduced cargo availability, would limit rates in the medium term.
Regarding dry bulk transport, Drewry estimates that approximately 30 million tons monthly of bulk trade —both international and intraregional— are at risk of disruption, equating to more than 1 trillion ton-miles, or just over 7% of global dry bulk transport demand. The Middle East region imports more than 150 million tons annually of bulk raw materials (grains, iron ore, coal, sugar, rice, steel, cement, and clinker) and exports a similar volume of fertilizers, gypsum, limestone, and other minor bulk goods. More than 40% of this trade is transported on Supramax vessels, making this segment particularly vulnerable. Additionally, bulk carriers make approximately 7,000 annual transits through the Strait of Hormuz, about 20 a day.
Nevertheless, Drewry identifies partial counterbalancing factors for the dry bulk sector. Diversions around the Cape of Good Hope will increase sailing distances and voyage days, raising ton-mile demand and absorbing additional vessel capacity. Moreover, a prolonged conflict that increases crude and LNG prices could force energy-intensive economies in Asia and parts of Europe to rely more on coal for electricity generation. Asia accounts for nearly 90% of global coal demand, and any increase in thermal coal demand would directly translate to higher volumes of maritime bulk transport.
Containers, project cargo, and war risk insurance premiums
The container segment presents relatively lower exposure compared to other sectors, according to Drewry. The consultancy's AIS data indicates that, as of March 1, 158 container ships with a combined capacity of 691,000 TEUs were located in the Middle East (Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, and Persian Gulf), which represents only 2.1% of the world's active container fleet. An immediate consequence of the conflict is that shipping companies will delay their plans to return to the Suez Canal and maintain diversions around the Cape of Good Hope, which eliminates the threat of a gradual restoration of latent capacity to the market. Drewry points out that, in an oversupplied container market, the disruption represents a net positive factor for operators, which explains the rise in stock prices of container shipping companies on Monday, March 2. Gulf ports will effectively be out of service, and exporters and importers in the region will need to reroute their cargoes via land mixed with ports located outside the Persian Gulf, such as those in Oman, the Emirates, or Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea. This will entail longer transit times, higher costs, and potential port congestion at hubs outside the conflict zone.
Regarding breakbulk and project cargo, Drewry warns that Saudi Arabia —especially the port of Jubail— and the United Arab Emirates —particularly Jebel Ali— are fundamental centers for project cargo shipments and industrial goods. Major exports from the region include petrochemicals, plastics, aluminum, steel, oil and gas equipment, fertilizers, and construction materials, while imports encompass heavy machinery, construction materials, agricultural products, and industrial components. Ports like Duqm and Sohar in Oman, Khorfakkan in the Emirates, and Jeddah in Saudi Arabia could absorb some of the diverted traffic, but longer transit times and higher logistics costs would limit the sustainability of these alternatives in the long term, especially for project cargo that cannot be transported by land due to its dimensions.
Drewry indicates that, in the short term, refinery shutdowns and damage to infrastructure in Iran due to drone and missile attacks will reduce industrial production and slow energy and construction projects. However, once the conflict concludes, reconstruction could generate a significant increase in demand for project cargo, including heavy machinery, oil and gas equipment, steel structures, and industrial materials.
Across all segments, the increase in war risk insurance premiums is a determining factor. Major insurers have announced the withdrawal of coverage in the conflict zone starting March 5, after which they could offer new conditions differentiated by micromarkets. Given the magnitude of the risks, premiums are likely to be deterrent for shipowners, effectively keeping shipping activity in the region paralyzed until tensions are reduced. The duration of the conflict emerges as the key variable: U.S. authorities have mentioned that military operations could extend from four to five weeks, a period that, according to Drewry, would cause unprecedented volatility in freight rates, raise insurance and fuel costs, and severely limit the ability to deliver goods to their destinations in the Gulf.