More than 200,000 TEUs of capacity of deep-sea container ships could be trapped in the Persian Gulf as a consequence of the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz to commercial traffic, according to a network stress analysis published by the maritime consultancy Sea-Intelligence. The study was conducted following the decision of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which on February 28 declared the closure of this strategic route to commercial traffic, warning that any vessel attempting to transit through it would be considered a military target. The measure is interpreted as a strategic retaliation in response to the bombings by the United States and Israel on Iran.
Sea-Intelligence has used the itineraries published by shipping companies to model two scenarios. In a baseline scenario, where vessels strictly adhere to their scheduled timings without delays, at least 156,074 TEUs of deep-sea capacity could not leave the Persian Gulf. However, by applying historical delay margins that reflect usual operating conditions, the blocked capacity rises to 204,159 TEUs in an adjusted scenario. The difference of 48,085 TEUs represents additional capacity that would effectively remain trapped simply because vessels are already accumulating delays against their original schedule, illustrating how existing inefficiencies in regular shipping networks can amplify the impact of geopolitical disruptions, according to the consultancy.
Alan Murphy, CEO of Sea-Intelligence, has warned that a prolonged disruption would generate immediate domino effects across the global container network. Vessels currently en route to the Persian Gulf would be forced to abort their rotations, causing sudden cargo shifts to alternative transshipment hubs outside the bottleneck, such as Salalah, Colombo, and Singapore. This sudden diversion would raise occupancy density at terminals, degrading port productivity and generating delays in the berthing of vessels from shipping lines completely unrelated to the traffic of the Persian Gulf.
Murphy also pointed out a particularly relevant structural effect: because the Persian Gulf is a net importing region, deep-sea services operating in it often load empty containers to reposition them to Asian manufacturing centers. The simultaneous blocking of more than 200,000 TEUs of capacity would deprive Asian export ports of vital equipment, risking a container shortage in the Far East.
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has a direct and quantifiable impact on the prices of oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG). The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that the net global oil supply will drop by eight million barrels per day during March. International commodity markets for sulfur, helium, urea, naphtha, and petrochemical products, all linked to energy production in the Middle East, are already experiencing shortages with cascading effects on other industrial sectors, including maritime transport itself.
In the realm of bunker fuel, the situation is critical. In Singapore, VLSFO prices have doubled since the onset of the conflict between the United States and Iran at the end of February and now exceed $1,000 per ton, up from $400 noted at the beginning of the year. The specialized publication Ship & Bunker forecasts VLSFO prices around $700 per ton during the second quarter globally. But the price is only part of the problem: the basic availability of fuel is already questionable in some ports.
Maersk, one of the largest consumers of marine fuel in the world, has informed its clients that it is proactively redistributing its own fuel reserves to ensure supply at the points where its fleet operates. The Danish shipping company believes there is enough fuel globally but acknowledges that it is unevenly distributed.
Ship & Bunker points out as a possible relief measure that regulators suspend the requirements of the IMO 2020 regulation on VLSFO and allow vessels to burn heavy fuel oil (HFO) again without scrubbers. This would free up distillate ingredients for blending into higher-value fuels used by other sectors, such as diesel and aviation fuel, both of which are in short supply.
Third-order effects are already reaching countries with a heavy dependence on specific crude oils from the Persian Gulf. Japan imports 95% of its oil from the Middle East, and South Korea obtains approximately 70% from that region. Seoul has already imposed a national cap on refined fuel prices. New Zealand, which lacks its own refineries and obtains approximately half of its fuel from South Korea, would face a rapid shortage if the Korean government restricted exports of diesel, gasoline, and aviation kerosene. The country currently has less than 50 days of diesel reserves and even smaller amounts of aviation fuel, and energy rationing measures are already being considered.